"It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceiv'd by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination; either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceiv'd in the aforesaid ways."

— Bishop George Berkeley, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

"For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceiv'd, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, [to be is to he perceived] nor is it possible they shou'd have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."

— Bishop George Berkeley, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
“The table I write on, I say, exists, i.e. I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.”

— Bishop George Berkeley, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

“[S]o long as they are not actually perceiv’d by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit”

— Bishop George Berkeley, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

“Now the set rules or establish’d methods, wherein the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature: and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.”

— Bishop George Berkeley, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
“All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.”

— David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature

“All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact.”

— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
“All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relations of Cause and Effect.”
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

“I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.”
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
"As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist."

— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

"[W]e always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them."

— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748

"He would not at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect, since the particular powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event in one instance precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect."

— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748
“If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be probable only, ...”
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748

“Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748